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Abstract 
 
We investigate how emotions and past violence influence foreign policy attitudes via 
a survey experiment in Georgia. Using a stratified sample across areas with 
differential exposure to the conflict and the presence of internally displaced persons, 
we randomly assign respondents to receive emotional primes about Russian 
aggression in the region. We find that exposure to violence, as well as simply being 
reminded about Russian increase the perceived threat from Russia, and to a lesser 
extent anger towards Russia. Individuals who receive the primes are more supportive 
of a hardline foreign policy. We also find that exposure to violence increases support 
for a hardline foreign policy indirectly, through increased anger and threat.  
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Section 1 Motivation 
One of the most salient aspects of conflict is the psychological and emotional effects on 
those victimized. As one Syrian father noted about the effect of Syrian Civil War violence 
on his son, “(he) wakes up afraid in the middle of the night. He wakes up screaming. …A 
child was slaughtered in front of him, so he started to dream that someone is coming to 
slaughter him?”4 The lingering effects of wartime violence on increased trauma and stress 
are well documented and do not end with the cessation of hostilities (Steel et al., 2009). 
Further, research suggests that the effects of violence and political conflict can have 
intergenerational consequences that can last far beyond the end of the hostilities 
(Voigtländer and Voth, 2012, Acharya et al. 2016).   
 
Conflict also changes underlying political dynamics, and how individuals view politics. 
Attitudes on justice and potential for reconciliation are shaped by their previous 
experiences during the conflict. For instance, one victim of displacement by the Colombian 
FARC rebels who opposed an amnesty deal between the Colombian government and the 
rebels stated, “the FARC are a bunch of assassins and jail is the very least the guerrillas 
should get for all the suffering they have caused to so many people. Without that, there's 
no peace.”5  Recent research backs up this anecdote that conflict can harden political 
attitudes in the context of intergroup conflict (Hirsch-Hoefler et al. 2014). 
 
                                                 
4 Save the Children http://i2.cdn.turner.com/cnn/2017/images/03/07/invisible_wounds.pdf  
5 See http://www.reuters.com/article/us-colombia-peace-idUSKCN10Z0I4?il=0 
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In the context of ongoing, or intractable conflicts, attitudes towards the conflict 
become the main axis of political competition (Bar-Tal 2000). In particular scholars 
have looked at two related phenomena: 1) the effects of exposure to violence, and 2) 
how emotions influence political behavior. Being exposed to violence can increase 
political participation (Blattman 2009, Bateson 2012), and altruism (Zeitzoff 2014, 
Bauer et al. 2016). However, it has also been found to increase hardline political 
attitudes (Canetti et al 2009, Getmansky and Zeitzoff 2014). Emotions in the context 
of intergroup conflict are particularly effective at motivating and shaping political 
attitudes and behavior. With threat perception and anger likely to increase negative 
attitudes towards the outgroup (Huddy et al. 2005, Young 2016). 
 
To understand what influences political attitudes in the shadow of conflict it is 
necessary to disentangle the effects of past violence. Yet many of the previous cited 
studies papers use aggregate-level data (e.g., villages, municipalities, etc.) and look at 
how exposure changes aggregate outcomes (e.g., votes, political attitudes). In these 
papers the effect of individual exposure is assumed to be constant, i.e., “people got 
mad, or afraid and now vote or support x.” Others that do look at individual exposure 
and political behavior, 6  generally observe exposure to violence, and some 
downstream outcome (such as political preferences, voting behavior, altruism, etc.), 
but do not directly test the psychological mechanisms, in particular emotions. Even 
                                                 
6 See Bauer et al. (2016) for a nice review 
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those scholars that do look at emotions generally do so via mediation and not by 
directly manipulating them. 7  
 
Georgia represents an ideal case to explore the effects of different emotions and 
exposure to violence on foreign policy attitudes for three reasons. First foreign policy 
and security issues are extremely salient. Georgia has faced numerous episodes of 
violence since its independence in 1991. It has fought a series of conflicts with 
Russian-backed separatists and with Russia (2008), over the breakaway regions of 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia, that has led to over 230,000 internally displaced persons 
(IDPs) from the conflicts. Second there is considerable geographic and individual 
variation in exposure to violence and threat perception, with IDP settlements and 
areas closer to Ossetia and Abkhazia facing higher exposure and threat. Finally 
Georgia’s military is much weaker compared to Russia’s. Unlike individuals in 
comparatively stronger military states, Georgians must weigh their desire for an 
aggressive foreign policy, against the possibility of provoking Russia. 8  
 
We explore how emotions and victimization influence foreign policy attitudes via a 
survey experiment conducted in Georgia in October and November of 2015. For our 
                                                 
7 A few notable exceptions include Zeitzoff (2014), Callen et al. (2014), Young (2016), and 
Zeitzoff (2017).  Yet none of these studies explicitly focuses on foreign policy attitudes.  
8 https://www.ndi.org/publications/ndi-poll-georgians-increasingly-support-eu-and-euro-atlantic-
aspirations-view-russia  
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survey experiment we stratify on the presence of IDPs and across different regions of 
Georgia that experienced different degrees of exposure to past-violence from the 
conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. In our survey experiment we randomly 
assigned people to one of four treatments: 1) a pure control condition (Control); 2) a 
prime people about past and current Russian aggressive actions in the region (Pure 
Information Treatment); 3) a prime about past and current Russian aggressive 
actions designed to elicit anger about Russian actions (Anger Treatment); and 4) a 
prime about past and current Russian aggressive actions designed to elicit fear about 
it (Fear Treatment). Following the manipulation we had subjects answer questions 
related to their level of threat and anger at Russian actions in the region, support for 
Georgia joining the NATO—which is viewed as a provocative step by Russia,9 and 
willingness to recognize an independent South Ossetia and Abkhazia in exchange for 
reducing tensions with Russia.  
 
We find that simply reminding respondents about Russian aggression (receiving the 
Fear, Anger, or Pure Information treatments) leads Georgians to view Russia as more 
threatening, and slightly more angry. It also leads respondents to be more in favor of 
a hardline foreign policy—supportive of Georgia joining NATO, and less supportive of 
independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Finally, IDPs and those exposed to past 
                                                 
9  https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/nato-and-the-eu-desert-
georgia/2016/06/16/20f2c7dc-33be-11e6-8758-
d58e76e11b12_story.html?utm_term=.52a89962fe68  
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violence are more likely to view Russia as threatening and are angry at Russian 
actions in the region. Mediation result suggest that the effect of violence on policy 
attitudes (Georgia joining NATO, or independence for Abkhazia or South Ossetia) is 
indirect via threat and anger. Our findings provide evidence that emotions about 
conflict, and victimization have distinct effects on attitudes. They further suggest that 
reminders of past violence can serve as a catalyst for support for more aggressive 
foreign policies, and are a potential mechanism for the continuation of conflict, even 
in states such as Georgia that are facing threats from much stronger adversaries.   
 
Section 2 Russian-Georgian Tensions 
Since Georgian independence in 1991, Russia-Georgia relations have been tense due 
to Russia’s support for the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The key 
explanation for Russian actions in Georgia is Russia’s concern over Georgia’s 
increasing closeness to NATO. Russia views post-Soviet space (often qualified as ‘near 
abroad’ in Russian political parlance) as part of its ‘privileged interest’ and threatened 
by any cooperation between NATO and post-Soviet republics (Cameron and 
Orenstein, 2012). NATO’s expansion into these areas is viewed as a primary security 
threat to Russia.10  
 
                                                 
10 http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-
/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/589768 
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The origins of current Russia-Georgian tensions can be traced back to Georgian 
independence. Zviad Gamsakhurdia, the former Soviet dissident and first President 
elected in 1991, distinguished himself with his strong anti-Russian stance, 
marginalizing of non-Georgian minorities, and authoritarian rhetoric (Jones 2004). In 
1992 Gamsakhurdia fell victim to a coup d’état organized by leaders of paramilitary 
groups, who then installed former Soviet foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze in 
power (Driscoll 2015). While Shevardnadze incorporated Georgia in the Russian-led 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in 1993, Russian support toward 
separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia did not abate. In response 
Shevardnadze’s foreign policy became increasingly pro-Western. In 1999 Georgia 
became member of Council of Europe and joined NATO’s Planning and Review 
Process (PARP). The reformist wing of Shevardnadze’s elite, including future Rose 
Revolution leaders, Zurab Zhvania and Mikheil Saakashvili, were especially in favor 
of pro-Western policies.  
 
In November 2003, a series of anti-incumbent protests known as the Rose Revolution, 
led by the young, American-educated former Justice Minister Mikheil Saakashvili, 
toppled Shevardnadze’s regime. Yet even with the Western orientation of the 
Saakashvili-led government, Georgia and Russia were able to peacefully resolve the 
political crisis in the autonomous Georgian region Adjara in 2004.11 Relations soured 
once it became clear that membership in the European Union and NATO were 
                                                 
11 http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/untc/unpan018787.pdf  
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Saakashvili’s key foreign policy goals. Georgian political elites increasingly 
emphasized Russia’s ‘otherness,’ and argued that Georgia’s more natural alliance was 
with Western and European civilization.12 In 2006 Russia imposed trade embargo on 
Georgia and expelled a large numbers of Georgian labor immigrants in Russia.13 
Tensions culminated in 2008 when Georgia lost the 5-day long war with Russia over 
the control of South Ossetia (2008 Russo-Georgian War). Following the war, and the 
increasing Russian military presence in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Russia was 
increasingly framed as an occupier by President Sakaasshvili, and not simply a 
threatening neighbor. Yet, the Georgian public remained less hawkish than 
Sakaashvili’s government. A 2010 NDI poll showed 49 percent of public disapproved 
(as opposed to 38 percent approved) of Saakashvili’s foreign policy toward Russia.14 
 
Since Sakaashvili’s party was voted out of office in October 2012, anti-Russian 
rhetoric has decreased, but Georgia has kept integration with the West as its top 
foreign policy priority.15 Support for integration into NATO and EU is still strong. For 
example according to August 2015 public opinion poll 69 percent of respondents 
                                                 
12 http://www.parliament.ge/files/292_880_927746_concept_en.pdf  
13 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/04/06/AR2006040601894.html  
14 https://www.ndi.org/files/Georgia-Survey-Results-0411.pdf 
15 In 2014 Association membership plan with the EU was signed.  
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approved of Georgian government’s stated goal of joining NATO16 and 58 percent 
thought that Georgia should join European Union. 17  However attitudes towards 
Russia amongst the population are mixed. According to a 2016 IRI survey, even 
though 71 percent considered Russia to be country’s biggest threat, 59 percent 
strongly supported further dialogue with Russia,18 and 70 percent preferred Russia 
as a main economic partner.19  
 
Georgian attitudes towards Russia are wrapped up in attitudes towards the 
breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Conflicts in South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia broke out in the immediate aftermath of the breakup of the Soviet Union. 
Conflicts between the central government in Georgia and Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
stemmed from the different views on the political status of the autonomous republics. 
Underlying these tensions, ethnic Ossetians and Abkhaz were alienated and 
threatened by Gamsakhurdia’s nationalistic policies following Georgian 
independence (Cornell 2002, George 2009). Gamsakhurdia’s counterproductive 
                                                 
16 The range of support is within 60 to 80 percent of respondents since June 2012 being at its 
highest point of 81 percent in November 2013 
17 
https://www.ndi.org/files/NDI_Winter%20poll_2015_Public%20presentation_ENG_version%20
FINAL_0.pdf  
18 http://www.iri.org/resource/iri%E2%80%99s-center-insights-poll-georgians-maintain-pro-
western-attitudes-face-russian-threat 
19 http://crrc-caucasus.blogspot.com/2016/07/who-should-georgias-closest-economic.html 
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policies radicalized South Ossetian’s stance vis-a-vis Tbilisi but Abkhazia conflict is 
better explained as an outcome of long-standing grievances and historically rooted 
fear and distrust of Tbilisi (Oskanian 2013).  The War in Abkhazia (1992-1993) 
claimed more than 25,000 lives, while 1991-1992 South Ossetia War resulted in 1,000 
civilian and military casualties (Derluguian 1998 p. 263). The conflicts displaced large 
numbers of civilians, many former ethnic Georgian residents of South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia. Including the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, there are more than 230,000 IDPs, 
out of a total population of only 4.5 million (the exact figures of IDPs remain 
contested). Since their displacement in the early 1990s and again in 2008, the 
Georgian government has pursued a goal of ‘integration and return.’20 The Georgian 
government has used the right of return for ethnic Georgian IDPs as both a promise, 
and as a threat to “demographic(ally) re-conquest” Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Toal 
and Grono 2011 p. 656). After the 2008 Russo-Georgian War the possibility that 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia may never return to Georgia became widely accepted 
among the IDPs.21  
 
                                                 
20 https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/From-Responsibility-to-Response-
Nov-2011doc.pdf  
21 
http://www.cr.org/downloads/Displacement%20in%20Georgia_An%20Analysis%20of%20Surve
y%20Findings_201104_ENG.pdf   
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Before 2004 the conflicts in Abkhazia could be largely thought of as ‘frozen conflicts’ 
with Russian-brokered ceasefire and little progress on negotiations on conflict 
resolution (O’Loughlin et al. 2014).. Since the Rose Revolution of 2003 the conflicts 
became ‘unfrozen’ as Saakashvili government started to work actively to reintegrate 
these territories in Georgia proper. The policies were based but not limited to 
cracking down on smuggling through the conflict zones 22 , promoting alternative 
politicians opposing de-facto authorities 23 , initiating infrastructure development 
projects in and around these territories as means of alluring Abkhaz and Ossetian 
residents.24 However these policies could not prevent all-out-war in August 2008. 
Following the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, the Georgian government has increasingly 
lobbied for using the term of ‘Russian occupation,’ as Russian troops increased 
military presence in these territories and they patrol the South Ossetian and 
Abkhazian borders. Before the August 2008 the conflicts in Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia were characterized as ethnic conflicts (between Georgians and Abkhazians 
and Georgians and Ossetians) and at least partially (if not entirely) incited by Russian 
policies. After August 2008, the discussion of ethnic dynamics has substantially 
decreased and the conflict has been reframed strictly into Russia-Georgia standoff. 
Since 2008 Russia is listed as number one threat in official documents issued by 
Georgian government (Minesashvili 2016). ‘Aggressor,’ ‘occupant’ and ‘threat to 
                                                 
22 http://www.eurasianet.org/georgia/shida/story.html 
23 http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=15547 
24 http://www.civil.ge/files/files/GeorgianGovernmentReportWar.pdf 
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Georgian statehood’ and ‘threat to the very meaning of Georgianness’ are the common 
ways Georgian politicians describe Russia (Naskidashvili and Kakhishvili 2016). 
 
Finally, it is important to note that Georgians have closely followed Russian actions 
in the Ukraine, including the annexation of Crimea (March 2014) and Russian actions 
in the Donbass (April 2014-present). Many commentators have noted the similarities 
in the tactics used by Russia in Ukraine, and those they employed in the 2008 conflict 
with Georgia, (e.g., rapid deployment of forces, misinformation, and use of cyber 
campaigns).25 More broadly, Russian actions in Ukraine have only heightened the 
threat felt by Georgia and other former-Soviet countries from a resurgent Russia.26 
 
Section 3 Exposure to Violence, Emotions, and Foreign Policy  
International relations (IR) scholars have tended to focus on structural factors that 
shape the outbreak, duration, and dynamics of conflict (Fearon 1995, Schultz 1999, 
Powell 1999, Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, Fearon and Laitin 2003). Thus 
explanations for conflict have focused on macro-level factors such as ethnic balance 
of power, and economic or opportunistic mechanisms (Blattman and Miguel 2010, 
                                                 
25 https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/crimea-crisis-may-seem-like-georgia-russia-
situation-of-2008-but-its-really-not/2014/03/02/39db1890-a242-11e3-a5fa-
55f0c77bf39c_story.html?utm_term=.2f06eb680a35  
26 https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/24/world/europe/in-russias-frozen-zone-a-creeping-border-
with-georgia.html?_r=0    
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Cedermann et al. 2010). Yet many IR theories of conflict implicitly rely on micro-level 
processes, in particular describing individual motivations to support or participate in 
conflict (Humphreys and Weinstein 2008, Kertzer 2017). An important factor finding 
by conflict scholars is that past legacies of violence weigh heavily on present-day 
attitudes (Horowitz 2001, Voigtländer and Voth 2012, Archya et al. 2016). In the 
context of perceived intractable conflict, or during periods of uncertainty, past or 
current intergroup conflicts can become a focal rallying point for individuals or 
leaders, and define the central political cleavage in a society (Bar-Tal 2000, Petersen 
2002). Many times elites and political entrepreneurs strategically emphasize this 
history of violence for their own political gain (Gagnon 1996, de Figueiredo and 
Weingast 1997, Tilly 2003, Wilkinson 2006). In periods of instability, or when 
adversarial groups or neighboring actors are engaged in (perceived) threatening 
behavior, elites can use these legacies of violence to further underscore the threat 
faced by ingroup members (Posen 1993). Thus, past violence shapes how actors view 
and understand the current threat, which determines their susceptibility to past 
reminders of threat (Lake and Rothcild 1996). Feelings of threat are likely to be even 
more acute among groups or countries facing stronger adversaries (e.g., Georgia 
versus Russia) (Gvalia et al. 2013).   
 
Reminders of past violence are not only the only way in which violence influences 
present-day attitudes. Exposure to the violence itself also plays a crucial role. It affects 
political attitudes, and at a more basic level, the way people think and behave. 
Individuals exposed to violence are more risk-accepting and more altruistic (Whitt 
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and Wilson 2007, Voors et al. 2012, Callen et al. 2012, Gilligan et al. 2014, Zeitzoff 
2014, Bauer et al. 2016). It also makes individuals more likely to participate politically 
(Blattman 2009, Bateson 2012). Yet this altruism does not necessarily extend to 
outgroup members, with findings suggest that exposure to violence increases 
discrimination (Bauer et al. 2014, Zeitzoff 2017), and can also lead individuals to 
favor more hardline policies (Hersh 2013, Getmansky and Zeitzoff 2014, Grossman et 
al. 2015). Overall, violence is thought to reduce support for compromise. 
 
Yet what are the mechanisms by which past violence and conflicts influence present-
day attitudes and conflicts? How are elites able to mobilize people with these appeals? 
Increasingly, emotions are recognized as powerful factors in shaping political 
attitudes and ethnic conflict (McDermott, 2004, Albertson and Gadarian, 2015). 
Leaders and political entrepreneurs use emotions strategically to draw support for 
their policy (McDermott 2010). This type of strategic use of emotions is even stronger 
in the context of intergroup conflict and threat. Two emotions that many argue are 
central to understanding conflict are anger and fear (Bar-Tal et al. 2007, Young 2016). 
Both are considered core negative emotions, but they are hypothesized to have very 
different subsequent behavioral tendencies (Frijda 1988, Lerner and Keltner 2001). 
Anger is considered an action-oriented emotion, reducing risk perceptions, and 
increasing taking action to reconcile the cause of anger. Conversely, fear increases 
risk perception, and causes respondents to avoid the cause of fear (Lerner et al. 2003, 
Young 2016).  
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Furthermore, research by political psychologists, suggests that threat perception is a 
key component in how individuals make decisions on foreign policy. Huddy et al. 
(2005) show that increased threat perception, which is distinct from anxiety and fear, 
increases support for harsh terror policies. 27  Hirsch-Hoefler et al. (2014) in the 
context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict further show that exposure to violence 
increases psychological distress, which in turn increases threat perception. Using 
mediation they tie this increase in threat perception to increased militancy and 
reduced support for compromise. Exposure to violence is likely to increase feelings 
of threat from outgroups (Riek et al., 2006), and reduce support for compromise.  
 
The extant literature suggests that emotions and past exposure to violence are 
important mechanisms that shape foreign policy. Our paper tests three related 
important implications and gaps in this literature. 1) Does priming anger and fear 
over past violence lead to distinct attitudes? 2) Are the effects of these emotional 
primes different from the effect of exposure to violence? 3) Finally, how do emotional 
primes and exposure influence anger and threat perception, and in turn how do these 
influence support for aggressive foreign policy attitudes? 
 
In the context of Georgia we hypothesize that those with higher levels of exposure to 
violence will feel more angry and threatened by Russia, and also favor more hardline 
foreign policy towards Russia, and the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and 
                                                 
27 They “regard anxiety as an umbrella term for fear, anxiety, worry and related states” (p. 595).  
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Abkhazkia. We further hypothesize that emotional reminders about past violence 
may have differential effects. Those who are reminded about past and present 
Russian actions and primed to feel anger (Anger Treatment) will likely favor a 
harsher line on Russia, and less prone to reconcile with and recognize Abkhazia’s and 
South Ossetia’s independence (relative to the Fear Treatment and the Pure 
Information Treatment). Finally, we also expect that perceptions of threat will have a 
distinct effect from anger on foreign policy attitudes, with those who feel more 
threatened more likely to favor a hardline foreign policy.28 
 
 
Section 4 Survey Design and Summary Statistics 
The survey was carried between October and November of 2015 by the Caucasus 
Research Resource Center in Georgia (CRRC), a prominent research center that 
carries out the annual Caucasus Barometer survey.29 We were particularly interested 
in how exposure to past violence and emotions influence foreign policy attitudes. 
Hence our sample was designed to achieve geographic exposure to violence. We 
sampled across three geographic regions (strata): 1) Tbilisi, the capital and largest 
                                                 
28 Note some of our hypotheses differ slightly from pre-registration. For a full list of our pre-
registered hypotheses, see the Online Appendix. See Miguel et al. (2014) and the Experiments in 
Governance and Politics (EGAP) website (http://egap.org/) for a full discussion of the benefits of 
pre-registration. 
29 http://caucasusbarometer.org/en/datasets/  
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city, 2) Kutaisi, the third largest city in Georgia, and the location of the Georgian 
Parliament, and 3) those areas that were affected by the 2008 Russo-Georgian war 
(Conflict Affected). Our sample was further restricted to ethnic Georgians.30 Within 
each of these regions, we further oversampled areas that included settlements. It is 
important to note that while our sample is representative within our given strata and 
PSUs, our sample was explicitly not nationally representative. Rather, our sample was 
designed to efficiently get variation in exposure to conflict (IDPs and conflict-affected 
areas). Further discussion of our sample is contained in the Appendix (Table A.1 and 
Figure A.1).   
 
Respondents were surveyed face-to-to face. As part of a larger survey on political and 
corruption attitudes,31 respondents were randomly assigned to one of four treatment 
conditions: a 1) pure control condition (Control); 2) a reminder about past and 
current Russian aggression (Pure Information Treatment); 3) a reminder about past 
and current Russian aggression designed to induce fear (Fear Treatment), and 4) a 
reminder about past and current Russian aggression designed to induce anger (Anger 
Treatment). Two important points about the treatment should be emphasized. First, 
                                                 
30 We did this for two reasons--1) Georgia is 86.8% ethnic Georgian, and 2) many of the ethnic 
Azeris (6.3%) or Armenians (4.5%) are concentrated in southern regions not affected directly by 
the conflicts.   
31 We also conducted another survey experiment, examining attitudes towards corruption. 
Controlling for these previous treatments in this separate experiment does not influence any of 
our main results.  
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the Anger and Fear Treatments explicitly build on the Pure Information Treatment, 
by including the same information about current and past Russian actions in the 
region, but also include an emotional induction, “Please describe and tell us what 
most makes you ANGRY/AFRAID about Russia’s actions.” Second, these emotion 
inductions are designed to induce the targeted emotion, and have been used 
extensive in psychology, political science, and economics (Callen et al. 2014, Searles 
and Mattes 2015, Myers and Tingley 2016, Albertson and Gadarian 2016, Young, 
2016, Zeitzoff 2017). The full wording of the treatments can be found in the Appendix.  
 
Following the treatments, we then asked respondents their attitudes towards our five 
key dependent variables: 1) how much they consider Russia a threat to Georgia 
(Russia is a Threat); 2) how angry Russia’s (foreign policy) actions make them (Russia 
Angry); 3) whether they think Georgia should join NATO even if Russia threatens 
Georgia (Georgia Should Join NATO); 4) whether to reduce tensions with Russia 
Georgia should recognize an independent South Ossetia (Recognize South Ossetia); 
and 5) whether Georgia should recognize an independent Abkhazia (Recognize 
Abkhazia).  
 
Given the role that psychological orientations have been shown to play in foreign 
policy (Kertzer et al. 2014, Rathbun et al. 2016) we also measured individuals level of 
stress (Stress) and adherence to the a culture of honor (Nisbett and Cohen 1996). 
Previous research has found that partisanship is an important determinant of foreign 
policy attitudes (Berinsky 2007, Holsti 2009), so we also control for whether they 
 19 
support former Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili. Sakaashvili still remains a 
polarizing figure in Georgia politics, and support for him largely defines present-day 
foreign policy cleavages in Georgian politics (i.e., pro-Sakaashvili/European/Western 
versus anti-Sakaashvili/pro-Russian) (Saakashvili Support).32  
 
Part of our key research questions is to understand how exposure to violence 
influences foreign policy attitudes. We measured exposure violence in several ways. 
We compare individuals with official IDP to status to those without IDP status (IDP). 
We also look at whether respondents knew someone who was murdered in Abkhazia 
or South Ossetia  (Known Murder/Knew Someone Murdered). To get more fine-grain 
measures of exposure, we also created an index that summed whether individuals 
personally witnessed violence, were assaulted, extorted, knew someone who was 
murdered, etc. from the conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia (Total War 
Exposure). We also disaggregated exposure by whether it came from South Ossetia 
(South Ossetia Exposure) or Abkhazia (Abkhazia Exposure). We also include region 
fixed effects, by controlling for whether the respondent lived in Conflict Affected 
region (one of our key regions), or from Kutaisi (with Tbilisi being the base category).  
A full list of the variables and how they are measured is shown in the Appendix.  
  
                                                 
32 https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/10/world/europe/georgia-dream-party-wins-election.html  
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 Min. Max. Mean SD N 
IDP 0 1 0.36 0.48 1221 
Kutaisi 0 1 0.40 0.49 1223 
Conflict Affected 
Area 
0 1 0.36 0.48 1223 
Total War Exposure 0 1 0.13 0.21 1220 
South Ossetia 
Exposure 
0 1 0.04 0.12 1220 
Abkhazia Exposure 0 1 0.07 0.16 1223 
Know Someone 
Murdered 
0 1 0.10 0.30 1205 
Stress 0 1 0.48 0.23 1177 
Honor 0 1 0.81 0.19 1067 
Saakashvili Support 0 1 0.54 0.50 1091 
Education 0 8 5.27 1.39 1221 
Respondent's Age 18 93 49.01 17.93 1223 
Male 0 1 0.36 0.48 1223 
Married 0 1 0.61 0.49 1223 
Household Spending 1 8 3.01 1.45 1116 
 
Panel A: Independent Variables 
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 Min. Max. Mean SD N 
Russia is a Threat 0 1 0.66 0.29 1129 
Russia Angry 0 1 0.59 0.27 1152 
Georgia Join NATO 0 1 0.54 0.29 955 
Recognize Abkhazia 0 1 0.18 0.24 1140 
Recognize South 
Ossetia 
0 1 0.17 0.23 1139 
 
Panel B: Dependent Variables 
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
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Figure 1: Distribution of Perceptions of Threat and Anger Towards Russia.  
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Figure 2: Distribution of Attitudes on Foreign Policy Preferences. 
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Table 1 (Panel A) presents the summary statistics for the independent variables. By 
design, about a third of our sample is from Conflict Affected areas, and a third of our 
sample is from Kutaisi and Tbilisi. We also oversampled IDPs, who make up a third of 
our sample as well.33 Slightly over half of our respondents are Sakaashvili supporters.  
 
Figures 1 and 2, and Table 1 (Panel B) further shows that there is a fair amount of 
variation across our dependent variables. 34  In terms of emotions and threat 
perception, our average respondents view Russia as a very serious threat and are 
angry to very angry about Russia’s actions. In terms of policy, on average Georgians 
are supportive of Georgia joining NATO. Conversely, they are strongly opposed to 
recognizing both South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent from Georgia, even if it 
were to reduce tensions with Russia.35   
 
Section 5 Main Results 
Our analysis proceeds as follows. We first explore the relationship between anger 
towards Russia (Russia Angry), perceptions of threat (Russia Threat), and policy 
attitudes (joining NATO, recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent and 
                                                 
33 See Table A.4.1 in the Appendix, the correlation between conflict-affected areas and IDPs is 
0.35. 
34 All dependent variables are rescaled to lie between 0 and 1. 
35 Attitudes towards South Ossetia’s and Abkhazia’s independence are highly correlated (0.94).  
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show that they are positively correlated. We then examine how exposure to violence 
and our treatments influence perceptions of threat and anger towards Russia. Next, 
we examine the effects of exposure to violence and our treatments on policy attitudes. 
Additionally, we examine whether IDPs and non-IDPs respond differently to our 
treatments. Finally, we explore how past violence and our treatments effects on 
policy attitudes are mediated via anger towards and perceptions of threat of Russia.  
 
All of our regressions are OLS with standard errors clustered at the primary sampling 
unit (PSU) voting precinct-level. Our base regressions just include dummy variables 
to estimate average treatment effects (ATE). Some regressions control for geographic 
region (Kutaisi and Conflict Affected areas), partisanship (Saakashvili support), 
explore various ways of measuring exposure to violence (IDP status, Total War 
Exposure, Known Murder, South Ossetia Exposure, and Abkhazia Exposure), and 
include controls (Age, Sex, Marital Status, Education, and Monthly Household 
Spending). To allow comparison of effect sizes, all of our key dependent variables and 
independent variables have been rescaled to lie between 0 and 1. While most of our 
results are presented graphically, additional regression tables can be found in the 
Appendix, and robustness checks in the Online Appendix. 
 
5.1 Relationship Between Emotions and Attitudes 
 
Previous research has found that emotions and threat, particularly anger are 
powerful drivers of foreign policy attitudes.  In Table 2 we see whether anger towards 
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Russia and perceptions of threat of Russia are correlated with policy attitudes. 
Columns 1-3 look at the correlations between anger and threat and joining NATO, 
columns 4-6 recognizing Abkhazia, and columns 7-9 recognizing South Ossetia. Since 
anger and threat, as well as policy attitudes, are all measured post-treatment (in that 
they were measured after respondents received our treatment), we also examine the 
correlation for only those respondents that were assigned to the treatment condition 
(columns 3, 6, and 9).  
 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  
 
Georg
ia Join 
NAT
O  
Georg
ia Join 
NAT
O  
Georg
ia Join 
NAT
O  
Recogni
ze 
Abkhazi
a  
Recogni
ze 
Abkhazi
a  
Recogni
ze 
Abkhazi
a  
Recogni
ze South 
Ossetia  
Recogni
ze South 
Ossetia  
Recogniz
e South 
Ossetia  
 
Russia is a 
Threat  
0.17*** 
(0.05)  
0.17*** 
(0.05)  
0.18** 
(0.09)  
0.05 
(0.04)  
0.05 
(0.04)  
-0.02 
(0.09)  
0.06 
(0.04)  
0.05 
(0.04)  
0.00 
(0.08)  
Russia 
Angry  
0.15*** 
(0.05)  
0.16*** 
(0.05)  
0.16 
(0.10)  
-0.28*** 
(0.05)  
-0.27*** 
(0.04)  
-0.21** 
(0.09)  
-0.30*** 
(0.05)  
-0.29*** 
(0.04)  
-0.24*** 
(0.09)  
 
Observatio
ns  
903  820  218  1043  954  266  1043  955  263  
R2 0.084  0.089  0.105  0.078  0.086  0.056  0.092  0.099  0.065  
Controls   Yes    Yes    Yes   
 
Standard errors in parentheses  
Controls include Age, Sex, Marital Status, Education, and Monthly Household Spending. Note standard 
errors clustered at the voting precinct-level (PSU).  
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01  
 
 
Table 2: Correlations between Emotions and Support for Different Policies. Note that 
columns 3, 6, and 9 are those that only in the control condition. 
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Table 2 shows that anger (Russia Angry) and threat perceptions (Russia is a Threat) 
are strongly, and positively correlated with support for joining NATO (columns 1-3). 
This echoes previous findings that anger and threat can lead to a harder-line foreign 
policy. Our findings hold even if when we only examine the control condition (column 
3). Conversely, when examining attitudes recognition of independence of South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia (columns 4-9), we find that perceptions of threat from Russia 
are only weakly positively correlated with attitudes on independence. In contrast, 
anger is strongly positively correlated with harder-line attitudes against 
independence. This suggests that different foreign policies potentially have different 
emotional antecedents. 
 
Table 2 establishes that anger and threat perception of Russia are related to policy 
attitudes. We further have shown that anger and threat represent distinct effects 
when thinking about different policy options (i.e., joining NATO versus recognition of 
independence of the separatist regions). In the subsequent sections we further 
disentangle the relationship between anger, threat, and policy attitudes. We look at 
how exposure to violence and our treatments influence anger and perceptions of 
threat, and also how influence these key policy attitudes.  
 
5.2 Effect of the Treatments and Exposure on Anger and Threat 
We first explore two key interrelated questions: how do reminders about past violence  (our 
treatments), and actual exposure to violence influence perception of threat and anger? 
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In Figure 3 we present results on the effects of our treatments on perceptions of 
Russia’s threat to Georgia (Russia Threat) and their anger at Georgia (Russia Angry). 
The plots on the left hand side are without controls, and those on the right include 
controls. Contrary to our hypotheses, the Anger Treatment is not statistically 
different from the Fear Treatment or the Pure Information Treatment.36 In fact all our 
treatments, especially the Pure Information Treatment increase perceived threat 
relative to the Control Condition both with and without controls. In the bottom panel 
of Figure 3, we collapse the Fear, Anger, and Pure Information treatments into a 
dummy variable (Any Treat). The effects are positive and statistically significant. The 
effect of receiving any one of the three treatments on perceptions of threat is as large 
as partisanship (being a Sakaashvili supporter in Tables 3 and 4 in the Online 
Appendix).  
 
We also examine the effect of the treatments on respondents’ anger towards Russia’s 
foreign policy actions in Figure 3 (Russia Angry). Here are our findings are weaker. 
Again we find no statistical difference between the Anger, Fear, or Pure Information 
Treatments. They all modestly increase anger levels, but the effects are not as strong 
as increased threat perception. The same is true when we collapse the treatments to 
a single dummy variable (Any Treat).  
 
                                                 
36 Across all the regressions, the Anger Treatment, Fear Treatment, and Pure Information 
Treatment are not statistically different from each other.  
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In Figure 4 we examine how different measures of exposure to violence are related to 
anger towards and threat perception of Russia. No matter how we measure exposure 
to violence, all of our exposure measures are associated with higher perceptions of 
threat (Russia Threat) and to a lesser extent anger (Russia Angry) towards Russia. 
Whether comparing IDPs to non-IDPs (IDP), knowing someone who was murdered in 
South Ossetia or Abkahzia, (Known Murder), or looking at an index of violence 
exposure across the conflict (Total War Exposure), they all increase perceptions of 
threat, and marginally anger.  
 
In sum, the effects are strong and consistent. Receiving any one of the treatments that 
remind respondents about Russian aggression in the region strongly increases threat 
perception, and are as large as the effect of partisanship. Its effects on anger towards 
Russia are still positive, but comparatively weaker. Regardless of how it is 
measured—IDP status, knowing someone who was murdered, or the index of 
violence exposure—exposure to violence increases anger towards Russia and 
heightens threat perceptions.   
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Figure 3: Treatment Effects on Perceptions of Threat and Anger. Top plots include 
disaggregated treatments, while the bottom plots collapses all three treatments into a single 
dummy variable. Plots on the left side are average treatment effect (ATE), while those on the 
right side include controls (Kutaisi, conflict-affected, Sakaashvili support, Age, Sex, Marital 
Status, Education, and Monthly Household Spending). Based on regressions from Column 1 
(no controls) and Columns 3 (with controls) from Tables 3, 4, 5, and 6.   
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Figure 4:  Relationship Between Violence and Perceptions of Threat and Anger. Based 
on regressions shown in Column 3 (IDP), Column 5 (Known Murder), and Column 6 (Total 
Exposure) in Table 4 (Russia Threat) and Table 6 (Russia Angry).  
 
5.3 Effect of the Treatments and Exposure on Policy Attitudes 
 
How do reminders about Russian aggression (treatments) and exposure to political violence 
affect key foreign policy attitudes? These attitudes include support for Georgia joining 
NATO even if Russia threatens it militarily, and recognizing Abkhazia’s and South 
Ossetia’s independence to reduce tensions with Russia.  
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In Figure 5 we examine the effects of reminders about Russian aggression via the Anger 
Treatment, Fear Treatment, and Pure Information Treatment relative to the Control 
Condition on policy attitudes. The right panel of Figure 5 includes controls. Similar to the 
findings from the effects of the treatments on anger and perceptions of threat (Figure 3), 
the treatments are not statistically different from each other. In the bottom panel of Figure 
5 we collapse the treatments to a single dummy treatment (Any Treat). Receiving any 
treatment reminding about Russian aggression strongly increases support for joining 
NATO. This is true regardless of whether the treatments are disaggregated (top panel), or 
collapse the treatments (bottom panel), or the raw average treatment effects (left panel) or 
those with controls (right panel). The treatments also influence attitudes on independence 
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. While not as large of an effect, the findings are consistent 
with the treatments causing respondents to support a more hardline foreign policy. 
Receiving any one of the treatments reduces support for recognition of Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia. In sum, the treatments increase support for a tougher foreign policy stance towards 
Russia and the breakaway regions.   
 
Figure 6, examines how exposure to violence influences attitudes on foreign policy. The 
effects here are quite different than those on anger and exposure to violence (Figure 4). 
Neither IDP status (IDP), knowing someone killed in Abkhazia or South Ossetia (Known 
Murder), nor an index measure of violence (Total Exposure) have any significant, direct 
effects on foreign policy attitudes. It also should be noted that these findings differ from 
others who have found that exposure to violence increases hardline policies, and from our 
hypotheses.  
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The findings suggest that reminders of past violence (our treatments) have distinct, and 
strong effects on policies relative to exposure to violence. Our treatments increase support 
for a hardline foreign policy, yet exposure to violence, while increase perceptions of threat 
from and anger towards Russia, do not have a direct effect on policy attitudes. In the 
subsequent sections we compare the effects of our treatments on IDPs versus non-IDPs, 
and also how the effects of the treatments and exposure to violence on policy attitudes are 
mediated by perceptions of threat and anger.   
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Figure 5: Treatment Effects on Attitudes Towards NATO, Recognize South Ossetia, 
and Abkhazia. Top plots include disaggregated treatments, while the bottom plots collapses 
all three treatments into a single dummy variable. Plots on the left side are average treatment 
effect (ATE), while those on the right side include controls (Kutaisi, Conflict Affected, 
Sakaashvili Support, Age, Sex, Marital Status, Education, and Monthly Household Spending). 
Based on regressions from Column 1 (no controls) and Columns 3 (with controls) from Tables 
7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12.  
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Figure 6: Relationship Between Violence on Attitudes Towards NATO, Recognize 
South Ossetia, and Abkhazia. Based on regressions shown in Column 3 (IDP), Column 5 
(Known Murder), and Column 6 (Total Exposure) in Table 8 (Georgia NATO), Table 10 
(Recognize Abkhazia), and Table 12 (Recognize South Ossetia). 
 
5.4 Comparing Treatment Effects of IDPs versus Non-IDPs 
 
Perhaps those exposed to violence responded differently to the treatments relative to 
those that are not as exposed? To answer this question, in Figure 7 we compare 
treatment effects (receiving any treatment) for IDPs relative to non-IDPs for both 
anger and perceptions of threat towards Russia, as well as foreign policy attitudes. 
Whether looking at anger and perceptions of threat (Russia Threat and Russia Anger) 
or policy attitudes (Georgia NATO, Recognize Abkhazia, and Recognize South 
Ossetia), there are no statistical differences in the response of IDPs and non-IDPs to 
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our treatment. Thus it does not appear that exposure to violence significantly affects 
the salience of reminding individuals of Russian aggression.  
 
Figure 7:  Treatment Effects on IDPs versus non-IDPs. Note it show the effect of receiving 
any one of the treatments comparing IDPs to non-IDPs. Coefficient results are drawn from 
Panel B in Table 13.  
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5.5 Mediation Effects 
 
We started off our analysis showing the correlation between anger towards and 
perceptions of threat from Russia with policy attitudes (Table 2). A key question 
might be how the treatments and exposure to violence influence foreign policy 
attitudes via anger and perceptions of threat? In other words, do anger and threat 
mediate the relationship between our key independent variables (treatments and 
exposure to violence) and foreign policy attitudes? To test this, we use Imai et al.’s 
(2010) general approach to mediation.  
 
In Figure 8 we present the results of mediation analysis. The top panel examines the 
effects of IDP status on policy attitudes (support for joining NATO, and recognizing 
Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s independence) mediated via perceptions of threat 
(top left) and anger (top right). The direct effect is effect of the IDP status on policy 
outcomes, while the average causal mediation effect (ACME) is the effect of IDP status 
through anger towards Russia (left) and perceptions of threat (right). The direct 
effects of the treatment for both threat (left) and anger (right) for policy outcomes 
are largely zero, echoing the findings from Figure 6, that there is no significant direct 
relationship between victimization and policy outcomes.  
 
However, the ACME suggests that the effects of victimization on policy preferences 
operate largely via anger and threat. Increased threat resulting from being an IDP 
increases support for joining NATO, and reducing support for recognizing Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia (top left). The effects of IDP status on anger (top right) largely 
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match the effects of threat. These findings suggest that the effects of exposure to 
violence on policy outcomes largely operate through anger and threat, and in doing 
so, increase support for a hardline foreign policy.  
 
In the bottom plot, we examine the effects of the treatment on policy attitudes 
mediated via perceptions of threat from Russia (bottom left) and anger (bottom 
right). In contrast to the effects of exposure to violence (top), the direct effect of 
receiving any of the treatments significantly increases support for joining NATO, and 
reduces support for Akbhazia’s and South Ossetia’s independence. Conversely, the 
ACME is much smaller, and largely zero.  
 
The mediation findings provide further nuance to how emotions and reminders of 
past violence influence attitudes.37 Both exposure to violence and our treatments 
increase support for hardline policies, yet via different pathways. Exposure to 
violence increases threat perceptions and anger, and its effect on policy is largely 
driven via mediation. In contrast, even though our treatments increased perceptions 
of threat, and to a lesser extent anger, their effect on policy is direct, and largely not 
mediated via threat or anger. Taken together these findings suggest that exposure to 
                                                 
37 It is important to note that ACME requires the extra, somewhat strong sequential ignorability 
assumption. First, the treatment must be random conditional on the observed covariates. This is 
easily met for the primes, since they are experimentally manipulated, but potentially difficult for 
the IDP status. The second more difficult assumption is that the values of the mediator (anger and 
treat) should be as-if randomized conditional on the treatment and observed covariates. Thus the 
effect of mediation requires the extra assumption that there is no unobserved pretreatment 
variable that confounds the relationship between anger and threat and the outcome.  
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violence may indeed create emotional grievances, while reminders about past and 
current aggression (treatments) operate at a more cognitive level.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 8 Mediation Effects. Top panel looks at the effect of victimization (IDP status) as 
mediated through perceptions of Russian threat (left), and anger at Russia (right) on attitudes 
toward NATO, recognition of Abkhazia, and recognition of South Ossetia. Bottom panel looks 
at the effect of the treatment as mediated through as mediated through perceptions of 
Russian threat (left), and anger at Russia (right) on attitudes toward NATO, recognition of 
Abkhazia, and recognition of South Ossetia. All analyses include the following variables in 
both the first stage and second stage equations (any treatment, IDP status, Kutaisi, conflict-
affected, Sakaashvili support, Age, Sex, Marital Status, Education, and Monthly Household 
Spending). Direct and average causal mediation effects (ACME) were calculated using 1,000 
simulations using the medeff package in STATA (Imai et al., 2010).  
 
 
Section 7 Conclusion 
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Using a survey experiment, we examined how exposure to conflict and reminders about 
past and current aggression influence foreign policy attitudes. We have four key findings. 
First, we show that anger and threat perceptions are positively related to foreign policy 
attitudes. Second we show that exposure to violence increases perceptions of threat, and 
anger towards Russia. Furthermore our treatments—simply reminding respondents about 
Russian aggression—increase perceptions of threat, and to a lesser extent anger. Third, our 
treatments further increase support for joining NATO, and decrease support for 
recognizing the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent from 
Georgia. Finally, our mediation analysis suggests that exposure to violence and reminders 
of Russian aggression both increase support for hardline policies, albeit through different 
pathways. Reminders of Russian aggression directly increase support for hardline policies 
at a more cognitive level. Conversely, exposure to violence increases support for hardline 
foreign policy via increased anger and threat perceptions (an emotional level).  
 
There are several important implications from our findings. They bring nuance to the recent 
literature on the effects of exposure to violence. Many scholars have recently written how 
exposure to violence influences political behavior and attitudes (Hersh 2013, Getmansky 
and Zeitzoff, 2014, Bauer et al 2016). We show that exposure to violence can increase 
anger and perceptions of threat, and in turn, can have an indirect effect (via anger and 
threat) on policy attitudes. This suggests that the causal chain between exposure to violence 
and political attitudes travels via emotions. Scholars and policymakers should not ignore 
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the importance of emotions on political violence and “black-box” the causal process of 
exposure to violence.  
 
Our experimental findings are equally important. They show that the simply reminding the 
public about past and current aggression from external rivals can harden foreign policy 
attitudes. From a policy point of view this is particularly important. Given the importance 
of intractable conflicts, frozen conflicts, and enduring rivalries that undergird much of the 
IR literature (Goertz and Diehl 1993, Bar-Tal 2000, Petersen 2002), we provide two 
mechanisms through which these conflicts can endure. Hardline leaders and political 
entrepreneurs can use past conflicts as a rallying cry to strengthen their position and 
increase support for tougher foreign policies towards adversaries. Reminding the public of 
more powerful adversaries actions leads to increased feelings threat and anger, which 
further can increase support for a more confrontation foreign policy. Even in a militarily 
weak state such as Georgia, these feelings do not increase support for actions that may 
diffuse the situation. Rather they spur a more confrontational foreign policy and taking 
actions that can ameliorate the threat (NATO). Thus providing a mechanism for how the 
continuation of the conflict.  
 
Future research should disentangle the separate effects of emotions and exposure to 
violence on conflict attitudes and behavior. It should also pay attention to how leaders use 
these appeals strategically for their own benefits. Leaders’ strategic use of appeals to garner 
support and sway foreign policy is a crucial next step to better understanding conflicts, and 
potentially finding strategies to bring them to a peaceful resolution. 
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ONLINE APPENDIX 
 
TABLES 
 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  
 
Russia is 
a Threat  
Russia is 
a Threat  
Russia is 
a Threat  
Russia is 
a Threat  
Russia is 
a Threat  
Russia is 
a Threat  
Russia is 
a Threat  
 
Pure Information 
Treatment 
0.06** 
(0.02)  
0.06** 
(0.02)  
0.06** 
(0.03)  
0.08*** 
(0.03)  
0.06** 
(0.03)  
0.06** 
(0.03)  
0.06** 
(0.03)  
Anger Treatment  
0.05* 
(0.03)  
0.05* 
(0.03)  
0.05* 
(0.03)  
0.05 
(0.03)  
0.05* 
(0.03)  
0.05* 
(0.03)  
0.05* 
(0.03)  
Fear Treatment  
0.04 
(0.03)  
0.04 
(0.03)  
0.05* 
(0.03)  
0.06* 
(0.03)  
0.05* 
(0.03)  
0.04 
(0.03)  
0.05 
(0.03)  
Kutaisi   
-0.04 
(0.04)  
-0.03 
(0.04)  
-0.03 
(0.04)  
-0.05 
(0.04)  
-0.04 
(0.04)  
-0.05 
(0.04)  
Conflict Affected 
Area  
0.01 
(0.04)  
0.03 
(0.04)  
0.04 
(0.05)  
0.05 
(0.04)  
0.03 
(0.04)  
0.01 
(0.04)  
IDP   
0.10*** 
(0.03)  
0.12*** 
(0.03)  
0.10** 
(0.04)     
Saakashvili 
Support    
0.06** 
(0.02)  
0.06** 
(0.02)  
0.06** 
(0.02)  
0.06** 
(0.02)  
0.07*** 
(0.02)  
Stress     
0.11** 
(0.05)     
Honor     
-0.02 
(0.09)     
Knew Someone 
Murdered     
0.10*** 
(0.04)    
Total War 
Exposure       
0.23*** 
(0.08)   
South Ossetia 
Exposure       
0.45*** 
(0.10)  
Abkhazia 
Exposure        
0.17 
(0.10)  
 
Observations  1129  1129  937  813  928  937  937  
R2 0.006  0.049  0.082  0.084  0.064  0.075  0.084  
Controls  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
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Standard errors in parentheses  
Controls include Age, Sex, Marital Status, Education, and Monthly Household Spending. Note standard 
errors clustered at the voting precinct-level (PSU).  
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01  
 
 
Table 3: Dependent Variable: How much of a threat is Russia (OLS)? 
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 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  
 
Russia is 
a Threat  
Russia is 
a Threat  
Russia is 
a Threat  
Russia is 
a Threat  
Russia is 
a Threat  
Russia is 
a Threat  
Russia is a 
Threat  
 
Any Treatment  
0.05** 
(0.02)  
0.05** 
(0.02)  
0.05** 
(0.02)  
0.06** 
(0.03)  
0.05** 
(0.02)  
0.05** 
(0.02)  
0.05** 
(0.02)  
Kutaisi   
-0.04 
(0.04)  
-0.02 
(0.04)  
-0.03 
(0.04)  
-0.05 
(0.04)  
-0.04 
(0.04)  
-0.05 
(0.04)  
Conflict Affected 
Area  
0.01 
(0.04)  
0.03 
(0.04)  
0.04 
(0.05)  
0.05 
(0.04)  
0.03 
(0.04)  
0.01 
(0.04)  
IDP   
0.10*** 
(0.03)  
0.12*** 
(0.03)  
0.10** 
(0.04)     
Saakashvili 
Support    
0.06** 
(0.02)  
0.06** 
(0.02)  
0.06** 
(0.02)  
0.06** 
(0.02)  
0.07*** 
(0.02)  
Stress     
0.11** 
(0.05)     
Honor     
-0.02 
(0.09)     
Knew Someone 
Murdered     
0.10*** 
(0.04)    
Total War 
Exposure       
0.23*** 
(0.08)   
South Ossetia 
Exposure       
0.45*** 
(0.10)  
Abkhazia 
Exposure        
0.17 
(0.10)  
 
Observations  1129  1129  937  813  928  937  937  
R2 0.005  0.049  0.082  0.082  0.064  0.075  0.084  
Controls  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
 
Standard errors in parentheses  
Controls include Age, Sex, Marital Status, Education, and Monthly Household Spending. Note standard 
errors clustered at the voting precinct-level (PSU).  
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01  
 
 
Table 4 Dependent Variable: How much of a threat is Russia (OLS)? Note it collapses 
all three treatments into a single dummy variable (Any Treatment).   
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 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  
 
Russia 
Angry  
Russia 
Angry  
Russia 
Angry  
Russia 
Angry  
Russia 
Angry  
Russia 
Angry  
Russia 
Angry  
 
Pure Information 
Treatment 
0.02 
(0.02)  
0.02 
(0.02)  
0.02 
(0.02)  
0.03 
(0.02)  
0.02 
(0.02)  
0.02 
(0.02)  
0.02 
(0.02)  
Anger Treatment  
0.02 
(0.02)  
0.02 
(0.02)  
0.02 
(0.02)  
0.02 
(0.02)  
0.02 
(0.02)  
0.02 
(0.02)  
0.02 
(0.02)  
Fear Treatment  
0.03 
(0.02)  
0.03 
(0.02)  
0.03 
(0.02)  
0.03 
(0.03)  
0.02 
(0.02)  
0.02 
(0.02)  
0.02 
(0.02)  
Kutaisi   
-0.08** 
(0.03)  
-0.09** 
(0.03)  
-0.08** 
(0.04)  
-0.11*** 
(0.03)  
-0.10*** 
(0.03)  
-0.11*** 
(0.03)  
Conflict Affected 
Area  
-0.00 
(0.03)  
0.01 
(0.04)  
0.01 
(0.04)  
0.04 
(0.04)  
0.01 
(0.04)  
-0.01 
(0.04)  
IDP   
0.14*** 
(0.03)  
0.13*** 
(0.03)  
0.13*** 
(0.03)     
Saakashvili Support    
0.06*** 
(0.02)  
0.06*** 
(0.02)  
0.06*** 
(0.02)  
0.06*** 
(0.02)  
0.07*** 
(0.02)  
Stress     
0.04 
(0.05)     
Honor     
0.11 
(0.07)     
Knew Someone 
Murdered     
0.11*** 
(0.03)    
Total War Exposure       
0.29*** 
(0.07)   
South Ossetia 
Exposure       
0.46*** 
(0.14)  
Abkhazia Exposure        
0.28*** 
(0.09)  
 
Observations  1152  1152  950  823  941  950  950  
R2 0.002  0.108  0.135  0.144  0.101  0.137  0.141  
Controls  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
 
Standard errors in parentheses  
Controls include Age, Sex, Marital Status, Education, and Monthly Household Spending. Note standard 
errors clustered at the voting precinct-level (PSU).  
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01  
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Table 5: Dependent Variable: How angry do Russia’s actions in the region make you 
(OLS)? 
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 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  
 
Russia 
Angry  
Russia 
Angry  
Russia 
Angry  
Russia 
Angry  
Russia 
Angry  
Russia 
Angry  
Russia 
Angry  
 
Any Treatment  
0.02 
(0.02)  
0.02 
(0.02)  
0.02 
(0.02)  
0.03 
(0.02)  
0.02 
(0.02)  
0.02 
(0.02)  
0.02 
(0.02)  
Kutaisi   
-0.08** 
(0.03)  
-0.09** 
(0.03)  
-0.08** 
(0.04)  
-0.11*** 
(0.03)  
-0.10*** 
(0.03)  
-0.11*** 
(0.03)  
Conflict Affected 
Area  
-0.00 
(0.03)  
0.01 
(0.04)  
0.01 
(0.04)  
0.04 
(0.04)  
0.01 
(0.04)  
-0.01 
(0.04)  
IDP   
0.14*** 
(0.03)  
0.13*** 
(0.03)  
0.13*** 
(0.03)     
Saakashvili Support    
0.06*** 
(0.02)  
0.06*** 
(0.02)  
0.06*** 
(0.02)  
0.06*** 
(0.02)  
0.07*** 
(0.02)  
Stress     
0.04 
(0.05)     
Honor     
0.11 
(0.07)     
Knew Someone 
Murdered     
0.11*** 
(0.03)    
Total War Exposure       
0.29*** 
(0.07)   
South Ossetia 
Exposure       
0.46*** 
(0.14)  
Abkhazia Exposure        
0.28*** 
(0.09)  
 
Observations  1152  1152  950  823  941  950  950  
R2 0.001  0.107  0.135  0.144  0.101  0.137  0.141  
Controls  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
 
Standard errors in parentheses  
Controls include Age, Sex, Marital Status, Education, and Monthly Household Spending. Note standard 
errors clustered at the voting precinct-level (PSU).  
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01  
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Table 6: Dependent Variable: How angry do Russia’s actions in the region make you 
(OLS)? Note it collapses all three treatments into a single dummy variable (Any 
Treatment).   
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 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  
 
Georgia 
Join 
NATO  
Georgia 
Join 
NATO  
Georgia 
Join 
NATO  
Georgia 
Join 
NATO  
Georgia 
Join 
NATO  
Georgia 
Join 
NATO  
Georgia 
Join 
NATO  
 
Pure 
Information 
Treatment 
0.06** 
(0.03)  
0.06** 
(0.03)  
0.07** 
(0.03)  
0.07** 
(0.03)  
0.07** 
(0.03)  
0.07** 
(0.03)  
0.07** 
(0.03)  
Anger 
Treatment  
0.03 
(0.02)  
0.03 
(0.02)  
0.04 
(0.02)  
0.05* 
(0.02)  
0.04* 
(0.02)  
0.04 
(0.02)  
0.04* 
(0.02)  
Fear Treatment  
0.06** 
(0.02)  
0.06** 
(0.02)  
0.05* 
(0.03)  
0.07** 
(0.03)  
0.05* 
(0.03)  
0.05* 
(0.03)  
0.05* 
(0.03)  
Kutaisi   
-0.11** 
(0.04)  
-0.11** 
(0.05)  
-0.12*** 
(0.04)  
-0.12*** 
(0.04)  
-0.12*** 
(0.04)  
-0.12*** 
(0.04)  
Conflict 
Affected Area  
-0.06 
(0.04)  
-0.06 
(0.04)  
-0.04 
(0.04)  
-0.06 
(0.04)  
-0.05 
(0.04)  
-0.07 
(0.04)  
IDP   
0.01 
(0.04)  
0.00 
(0.04)  
-0.01 
(0.04)     
Saakashvili 
Support    
0.05* 
(0.02)  
0.05* 
(0.02)  
0.05** 
(0.02)  
0.05* 
(0.02)  
0.05** 
(0.02)  
Stress     
-0.08 
(0.06)     
Honor     
-0.10 
(0.08)     
Knew Someone 
Murdered     
0.01 
(0.04)    
Total War 
Exposure       
-0.04 
(0.08)   
South Ossetia 
Exposure       
0.02 
(0.14)  
Abkhazia 
Exposure        
-0.08 
(0.10)  
 
Observations  955  955  799  711  791  799  799  
R2 0.007  0.030  0.035  0.052  0.037  0.036  0.037  
Controls  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
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Standard errors in parentheses  
Controls include Age, Sex, Marital Status, Education, and Monthly Household Spending. Note standard 
errors clustered at the voting precinct-level (PSU).  
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01  
 
 
Table 7: Dependent Variable: Georgia should join NATO (Disagree-Agree) (OLS).  
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 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  
 
Georgia 
Join 
NATO  
Georgia 
Join 
NATO  
Georgia 
Join 
NATO  
Georgia 
Join 
NATO  
Georgia 
Join 
NATO  
Georgia 
Join 
NATO  
Georgia 
Join 
NATO  
 
Any Treatment  
0.05** 
(0.02)  
0.05** 
(0.02)  
0.05** 
(0.02)  
0.06*** 
(0.02)  
0.06** 
(0.02)  
0.05** 
(0.02)  
0.05** 
(0.02)  
Kutaisi   
-0.11** 
(0.04)  
-0.11** 
(0.05)  
-0.12*** 
(0.04)  
-0.12*** 
(0.04)  
-0.12*** 
(0.04)  
-0.12*** 
(0.04)  
Conflict 
Affected Area  
-0.06 
(0.04)  
-0.06 
(0.04)  
-0.04 
(0.04)  
-0.06 
(0.04)  
-0.05 
(0.04)  
-0.07 
(0.04)  
IDP   
0.01 
(0.04)  
0.00 
(0.04)  
-0.01 
(0.04)     
Saakashvili 
Support    
0.05** 
(0.02)  
0.05* 
(0.02)  
0.05** 
(0.02)  
0.05** 
(0.02)  
0.05** 
(0.02)  
Stress     
-0.08 
(0.06)     
Honor     
-0.10 
(0.08)     
Knew Someone 
Murdered     
0.02 
(0.04)    
Total War 
Exposure       
-0.04 
(0.08)   
South Ossetia 
Exposure       
0.02 
(0.13)  
Abkhazia 
Exposure        
-0.08 
(0.10)  
 
Observations  955  955  799  711  791  799  799  
R2 0.006  0.029  0.034  0.051  0.036  0.034  0.036  
Controls  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
 
Standard errors in parentheses  
Controls include Age, Sex, Marital Status, Education, and Monthly Household Spending. Note standard 
errors clustered at the voting precinct-level (PSU).  
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01  
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Table 8: Dependent Variable: Georgia should join NATO (Disagree-Agree) (OLS). 
Note it collapses all three treatments into a single dummy variable (Any Treatment).   
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 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  
 
Recognize 
Abkhazia  
Recognize 
Abkhazia  
Recognize 
Abkhazia  
Recognize 
Abkhazia  
Recognize 
Abkhazia  
Recognize 
Abkhazia  
Recognize 
Abkhazia  
 
Pure 
Information 
Treatment 
-0.02 
(0.02)  
-0.02 
(0.02)  
-0.02 
(0.02)  
-0.01 
(0.02)  
-0.02 
(0.02)  
-0.02 
(0.02)  
-0.02 
(0.02)  
Anger 
Treatment  
-0.02 
(0.02)  
-0.02 
(0.02)  
-0.02 
(0.02)  
-0.02 
(0.02)  
-0.02 
(0.02)  
-0.02 
(0.02)  
-0.02 
(0.02)  
Fear 
Treatment  
-0.05** 
(0.02)  
-0.05** 
(0.02)  
-0.05** 
(0.02)  
-0.06** 
(0.02)  
-0.05** 
(0.02)  
-0.05** 
(0.02)  
-0.05** 
(0.02)  
Kutaisi   
0.11*** 
(0.04)  
0.13*** 
(0.04)  
0.11*** 
(0.03)  
0.13*** 
(0.03)  
0.13*** 
(0.03)  
0.13*** 
(0.03)  
Conflict 
Affected Area  
0.02 
(0.03)  
0.01 
(0.03)  
0.02 
(0.03)  
0.01 
(0.03)  
0.01 
(0.03)  
0.00 
(0.03)  
IDP   
-0.02 
(0.04)  
-0.01 
(0.04)  
-0.02 
(0.03)     
Saakashvili 
Support    
0.03* 
(0.02)  
0.03* 
(0.02)  
0.03* 
(0.02)  
0.03* 
(0.02)  
0.03** 
(0.02)  
Stress     
0.08* 
(0.04)     
Honor     
-0.05 
(0.06)     
Knew 
Someone 
Murdered 
    
-0.03 
(0.03)    
Total War 
Exposure       
-0.02 
(0.07)   
South Ossetia 
Exposure       
0.02 
(0.11)  
Abkhazia 
Exposure        
-0.04 
(0.09)  
 
Observations  1140  1139  943  816  934  943  943  
R2 0.005  0.054  0.090  0.095  0.093  0.090  0.091  
Controls  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
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Standard errors in parentheses  
Controls include Age, Sex, Marital Status, Education, and Monthly Household Spending. Note standard 
errors clustered at the voting precinct-level (PSU).  
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01  
 
 
Table 9: Dependent Variable: To reduce tensions with Russia, Georgia should 
recognize Abkhazia’s independence (Disagree-Agree) (OLS).  
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 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  
 
Recognize 
Abkhazia  
Recognize 
Abkhazia  
Recognize 
Abkhazia  
Recognize 
Abkhazia  
Recognize 
Abkhazia  
Recognize 
Abkhazia  
Recognize 
Abkhazia  
 
Any 
Treatment  
-0.03* 
(0.02)  
-0.03* 
(0.02)  
-0.03* 
(0.02)  
-0.03* 
(0.02)  
-0.03* 
(0.02)  
-0.03* 
(0.02)  
-0.03* 
(0.02)  
Kutaisi   
0.12*** 
(0.04)  
0.13*** 
(0.04)  
0.11*** 
(0.03)  
0.13*** 
(0.03)  
0.13*** 
(0.03)  
0.13*** 
(0.03)  
Conflict 
Affected Area  
0.03 
(0.03)  
0.01 
(0.03)  
0.02 
(0.03)  
0.01 
(0.03)  
0.01 
(0.03)  
0.01 
(0.03)  
IDP   
-0.02 
(0.04)  
-0.00 
(0.04)  
-0.02 
(0.03)     
Saakashvili 
Support    
0.03* 
(0.02)  
0.03* 
(0.02)  
0.03* 
(0.02)  
0.03* 
(0.02)  
0.03** 
(0.02)  
Stress     
0.08* 
(0.04)     
Honor     
-0.05 
(0.06)     
Knew 
Someone 
Murdered 
    
-0.03 
(0.03)    
Total War 
Exposure       
-0.02 
(0.07)   
South Ossetia 
Exposure       
0.02 
(0.11)  
Abkhazia 
Exposure        
-0.05 
(0.09)  
 
Observations  1140  1139  943  816  934  943  943  
R2 0.003  0.053  0.087  0.091  0.091  0.087  0.088  
Controls  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes   
 
Standard errors in parentheses  
Controls include Age, Sex, Marital Status, Education, and Monthly Household Spending. Note standard 
errors clustered at the voting precinct-level (PSU).  
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01  
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Table 10: Dependent Variable: To reduce tensions with Russia, Georgia should 
recognize Abkhazia’s independence (Disagree-Agree) (OLS). Note it collapses all 
three treatments into a single dummy variable (Any Treatment).   
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 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  
 
Recognize 
South 
Ossetia  
Recognize 
South 
Ossetia  
Recognize 
South 
Ossetia  
Recognize 
South 
Ossetia  
Recognize 
South 
Ossetia  
Recognize 
South 
Ossetia  
Recognize 
South 
Ossetia  
 
Pure 
Information 
Treatment 
-0.02 
(0.02)  
-0.00 
(0.02)  
-0.01 
(0.02)  
-0.02 
(0.02)  
-0.01 
(0.02)  
-0.01 
(0.02)  
-0.01 
(0.02)  
Anger 
Treatment  
-0.02 
(0.02)  
-0.00 
(0.03)  
-0.02 
(0.03)  
-0.03 
(0.03)  
-0.02 
(0.03)  
-0.02 
(0.03)  
-0.02 
(0.03)  
Fear 
Treatment  
-0.04* 
(0.02)  
-0.03 
(0.02)  
-0.05* 
(0.03)  
-0.07** 
(0.03)  
-0.05* 
(0.03)  
-0.05* 
(0.03)  
-0.05* 
(0.03)  
Kutaisi   
0.09** 
(0.04)  
0.11*** 
(0.03)  
0.10*** 
(0.03)  
0.12*** 
(0.03)  
0.11*** 
(0.03)  
0.11*** 
(0.03)  
Conflict 
Affected 
Area 
 
0.00 
(0.03)  
-0.01 
(0.03)  
-0.02 
(0.03)  
-0.01 
(0.03)  
-0.01 
(0.03)  
-0.01 
(0.03)  
IDP   
-0.03 
(0.03)  
-0.01 
(0.03)  
-0.02 
(0.03)     
Saakashvili 
Support    
0.01 
(0.02)  
0.01 
(0.02)  
0.01 
(0.02)  
0.01 
(0.02)  
0.01 
(0.02)  
Stress     
0.02 
(0.05)     
Honor     
0.03 
(0.09)     
Knew 
Someone 
Murdered 
    
-0.02 
(0.02)    
Total War 
Exposure       
-0.02 
(0.05)   
South Ossetia 
Exposure       
0.02 
(0.11)  
Abkhazia 
Exposure        
-0.04 
(0.07)  
 
Observations  1139  1139  943  816  934  943  943  
R2 0.004  0.032  0.064  0.074  0.065  0.063  0.064  
Controls  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
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Standard errors in parentheses  
Controls include Age, Sex, Marital Status, Education, and Monthly Household Spending. Note standard 
errors clustered at the voting precinct-level (PSU).  
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01  
 
 
Table 11: Dependent Variable: To reduce tensions with Russia, Georgia should 
recognize South Ossetia’s independence (Disagree-Agree) (OLS).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  
 
Recognize 
South 
Ossetia  
Recognize 
South 
Ossetia  
Recognize 
South 
Ossetia  
Recognize 
South 
Ossetia  
Recognize 
South 
Ossetia  
Recognize 
South 
Ossetia  
Recognize 
South 
Ossetia  
 
Any 
Treatment  
-0.03 
(0.02)  
-0.03 
(0.02)  
-0.03 
(0.02)  
-0.03* 
(0.02)  
-0.03 
(0.02)  
-0.03 
(0.02)  
-0.03 
(0.02)  
Kutaisi   
0.11*** 
(0.04)  
0.12*** 
(0.03)  
0.11*** 
(0.03)  
0.13*** 
(0.03)  
0.13*** 
(0.03)  
0.13*** 
(0.03)  
Conflict 
Affected 
Area 
 
0.02 
(0.03)  
0.00 
(0.03)  
0.00 
(0.03)  
-0.00 
(0.03)  
-0.00 
(0.03)  
-0.00 
(0.03)  
IDP   
-0.03 
(0.03)  
-0.02 
(0.03)  
-0.03 
(0.03)     
Saakashvili 
Support    
0.03* 
(0.02)  
0.03* 
(0.02)  
0.03* 
(0.02)  
0.03* 
(0.02)  
0.03* 
(0.01)  
Stress     
0.04 
(0.04)     
Honor     
-0.04 
(0.06)     
Knew 
Someone 
Murdered 
    
-0.03 
(0.02)    
Total War 
Exposure       
-0.03 
(0.06)   
South Ossetia 
Exposure       
-0.00 
(0.11)  
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Abkhazia 
Exposure        
-0.04 
(0.08)  
 
Observations  1139  1138  942  815  933  942  942  
R2 0.002  0.060  0.098  0.107  0.102  0.098  0.098  
Controls  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes   
 
Standard errors in parentheses  
Controls include Age, Sex, Marital Status, Education, and Monthly Household Spending. Note standard 
errors clustered at the voting precinct-level (PSU).  
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01  
 
 
Table 12: Dependent Variable: To reduce tensions with Russia, Georgia should 
recognize South Ossetia’s independence (Disagree-Agree) (OLS). Note it collapses all 
three treatments into a single dummy variable (Any Treatment).   
 
 
 
  
 67 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  
 
Russi
a is a 
Thre
at  
Russi
a is a 
Thre
at  
Russ
ia 
Angr
y  
Russ
ia 
Angr
y  
Georgi
a Join 
NATO  
Georgi
a Join 
NATO  
Recogniz
e South 
Ossetia  
Recogniz
e South 
Ossetia  
Recogniz
e 
Abkhazi
a  
Recogniz
e 
Abkhazia  
 
Pure 
Information 
Treatment 
0.07*
* 
(0.03
)  
0.04 
(0.03
)  
0.05 
(0.04
)  
0.00 
(0.02
)  
0.11** 
(0.05)  
0.03 
(0.03)  
-0.02 
(0.03)  
-0.01 
(0.02)  
-0.03 
(0.03)  
-0.02 
(0.02)  
Anger 
Treatment  
0.06 
(0.04
)  
0.04 
(0.03
)  
0.04 
(0.03
)  
0.00 
(0.03
)  
0.03 
(0.04)  
0.03 
(0.03)  
0.01 
(0.04)  
-0.03 
(0.02)  
-0.01 
(0.03)  
-0.03 
(0.02)  
Fear 
Treatment  
0.09*
* 
(0.04
)  
0.02 
(0.03
)  
0.07* 
(0.04
)  
0.01 
(0.03
)  
0.07 
(0.04)  
0.05* 
(0.03)  
-0.01 
(0.03)  
-0.06** 
(0.03)  
-0.02 
(0.03)  
-0.06** 
(0.03)  
 
Observation
s  
415  714  423  729  347  608  418  720  421  718  
R2 0.015  0.004  
0.00
8  
0.00
1  
0.019  0.004  0.003  0.012  0.002  0.012  
 
Standard errors in parentheses  
Note standard errors clustered at the voting precinct-level (PSU).  
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01  
 
Panel A 
 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  
 
Russi
a is a 
Thre
at  
Russi
a is a 
Thre
at  
Russi
a 
Angr
y  
Russi
a 
Angr
y  
Georgi
a Join 
NATO  
Georgi
a Join 
NATO  
Recogniz
e South 
Ossetia  
Recogniz
e South 
Ossetia  
Recogniz
e 
Abkhazi
a  
Recogniz
e 
Abkhazia  
 
Any 
Treatment  
0.07*
* 
(0.03
)  
0.03 
(0.03
)  
0.05* 
(0.03
)  
0.01 
(0.02
)  
0.07* 
(0.04)  
0.04 
(0.03)  
-0.01 
(0.03)  
-0.04* 
(0.02)  
-0.02 
(0.03)  
-0.04* 
(0.02)  
 
 68 
Observatio
ns  
415  714  423  729  347  608  418  720  421  718  
R2 0.014  0.003  
0.00
7  
0.00
0  
0.010  0.003  0.000  0.005  0.001  0.005  
 
Standard errors in parentheses  
Note standard errors clustered at the voting precinct-level (PSU).  
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01  
 
Panel B 
 
Table 13: Comparing treatment effects for IDPs (columns 1, 3, 5, 7, 9) versus non-
IDPs. In Panel A the treatments are disaggregated, while Panel B collapses all three 
treatments into a single dummy variable.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Online Appendix 
 
A.1 Sampling Design  
 
The target population was broken down into three separate geographic strata, with an aim 
to sample approximately an equal number of respondents across the following three 
regions: Tblisi, Kutaisi, and conflict-affected areas (those affected by the 2008 Russo-
Georgian War). Conflict-affected areas include the Kaspi municipality, Gori municipality, 
Kareli municipality, Senaki municipality, Khobi municipality, Zugdidi municipality, Poti 
municipality and Tserovani IDP settlement. In each of the three geographic areas (Tbilisi, 
Kutasi and conflict-affected), we also sub-divided each stratum into those that had compact 
IDP settlements (i.e., areas exclusively reserved for IDPs), and non-IDP specific areas. 
This yields six strata: 1) Tbilisi non-IDP; 2) Tbilisi IDP; 3) Kutaisi non-IDP; 4) Kutaisi 
IDP; 5) conflict-affected non-IDP; and 6) conflict-affected IDP. We oversampled IDPs 15 
times higher than their share of the respective target population within each geographic 
stratum. In each of the three geographic strata we targeted 500 complete interviews and the 
sample size was based on expected response rate38 Each strata was further sub-stratified by 
settlement type (urban or rural), and the sample was divided proportionally to the 
                                                 
38 Expected response rates were taken from the latest CRRC surveys conducted in the relevant 
areas. However, the actual response rate was lower than expected (especially in Tbilisi) and we 
could not reach the target response 500 in any of the three geographic strata. 
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urban/rural population within each strata. See Figure 1 for a geographic distribution of our 
sample.  
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Figure A.1: Sampling Map 
 
The primary sampling unit (PSU) was at the voting precinct-level. Voting precincts were 
randomly selected within each stratum, with equal probability of selection within each 
substratum. In each PSU 32 households were sampled by interviewers following a random 
walk. Interviews were instructions (see details in Annex 1). The respondents in each 
sampled household were selected using Kish Tables.39 In the event that the interviewers 
failed to make contact with the household, or made contact with the household but failed 
to make contact with the selected household member, they returned for a second, and then, 
if necessary, for a third contact attempt before classifying the interview attempt as a non-
response. These repeated contact attempts were necessary in order to minimize selection 
bias for demographic groups that are more easily located at home (e.g., the elderly, the 
unemployed, etc.). Ninety-five percent of completed interviews were achieved at the first 
attempt. Overall distribution of the sample is summarized in table 1.     
                                                 
39 Kish, Leslie (September 1949), "A Procedure for Objective Respondent Selection within the 
Household", Journal of the American Statistical Association 44 (247): 380–387. For more 
accessible description of this method please see:   
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Using the AAPOR40 standard for determining response rate, i.e. an interview in which at 
least 50% of the questions had valid answers was counted as a full response. Table 1 
summarizes response rates per stratum. It shows that the overall response rate was 52%, 
and provides the distribution of responses across the three interview attempts in each 
stratum.   
 
Stratum Interview 
attempts 
Completed interviews Response 
rate 
  Total Attempt 1 Attempt 2 Attempt 3  
Tbilisi 
Non-IDP 
768 192 165 22 5 25% 
Tbilisi IDP 
253 101 81 16 4 40% 
Kutaisi 
Non-IDP 
559 406 246 142 18 73% 
Kutaisi 
IDP 
106 78 57 17 4 74% 
Conflict-
affected 
areas Non-
IDP 
256 185 151 32 2 72% 
Conflict 
affected 
area- IDP 
391 258 215 35 8 66% 
Total 2,333 1,220 915 264 41 52% 
 
Table A.1: Response Rates  
  
                                                 
40 AAPOR response definitions are available at  Please see also:  
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A.2 Measurement and Pre-registered Hypotheses 
 
A.2.1 Treatments and Measurement of Variables/ Survey Questions 
 
Treatments 
 
1. [No Information/Control Condition] 
 
2. Pure Information Treatment 
 
“Georgia faces many important foreign policy choices going forward including 
its relationship with the European Union, United States, and perhaps most 
importantly Russia. Russia and Georgia have had disagreements over Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia, and recent Russian actions in Ukraine--Donbas and Crimea 
further highlight tensions.” 
 
3. Anger Treatment 
 
“Georgia faces many important foreign policy choices going forward including 
its relationship with the European Union, United States, and perhaps most 
importantly Russia. Russia and Georgia have had disagreements over Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia, and recent Russian actions in Ukraine--Donbas and Crimea 
further highlight tensions. We are interested in your feelings about Russia’s past 
and current actions.  Specifically, we are interested in what makes you most 
ANGRY about Russia’s foreign policy actions. Please describe and tell us what 
most makes you ANGRY about Russia’s actions. Please be as detailed and specific 
as possible.” 
 
4. Fear Treatment 
 
“Georgia faces many important foreign policy choices going forward including 
its relationship with the European Union, United States, and perhaps most 
importantly Russia. Russia and Georgia have had disagreements over Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia, and recent Russian actions in Ukraine--Donbas and Crimea 
further highlight tensions. . We are interested in your feelings about Russia’s past 
and current actions.  Specifically, we are interested in what makes you most 
AFRAID about Russia’s foreign policy actions. Please describe and tell us what 
most makes you AFRAID about Russia’s actions. Please be as detailed and specific 
as possible.” 
 
 
Measurement of Variables 
• IDP- 1 if an individual has official status as an IDP, 0 if  not 
• Kutaisi- 1 if a respondent lives in the Kutaisi, 0 if not 
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• Conflict Affected Area- 1 if a respondent lives in a conflict affected area, 0 if 
otherwise 
• Total War Exposure- Sum of personal exposure of all instances below from 
conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia rescaled to lie between 0 and 1 
o Witnessed violence  
o Assaulted 
o Know Someone Murdered 
o Extorted 
o House confiscated 
o Suffered property damage 
o Displaced 
• South Ossetia Exposure- Degree of Total War Exposure stemming from South 
Ossetia) 
• Abkhazia Exposure- Degree of Total War Exposure stemming from Abkhazia 
• Know Someone Murdered -1 if the respondent Know Someone Murdered in 
conflicts in South Ossetia or Abkhazia, 0 otherwise 
• Stress- Drawn from the State-Trait Anxiety Inventor (Marteau and Bekker 1992) 
(*CITE), rescaled to lie between 0 and 1 (α=0.77) 
o A number of statements which have used to describe themselves are given below. 
Listen to each statement and tell us how you feel right now, at this moment. There 
are no right or wrong answers. (Not at All to Very Much) 
1. I feel calm*     
2. I am tense     
3. I am upset     
4. I am relaxed*     
5. I feel content*     
6. I am worried  
▪ *Revers Scored 
• Honor- Summative scale of the 7 following statements, rescaled to lie between 0 
to 1 (α=0.86). Adapted from (Mosquera et al. 2002) 
o Please rate the extent behaving or having a reputation as described in each item 
would damage how you felt about yourself (Not at All to Very Much) 
1. Your family having a bad reputation 
2. Not keeping your “word” 
3. You don’t show a guest proper hospitality  
4. Not defending yourself when others insult you 
5. Having female relatives who are known to be “loose” or ”easy” 
6. Letting others insult your family 
7. Not being loyal to one’s head of household /family  
 
• Saakashvili Support- 1 if the respondent chose statement A), 0 if they chose 
Statement B. 
o Statement A) Saakashvili was not perfect, but overall he was a good leader  
o Statement B) Saakashvili had some success, but overall he was a bad leader 
• Education-Highest achieved level of education (1-8) 
1. No primary education.  
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2. Primary education (either complete or incomplete) 
3. Incomplete secondary education 
4. Completed secondary education 
5. Secondary technical education. 
6. Incomplete higher education. 
7. Completed higher education (BA, MA, or Specialist degree) 
8. Post-graduate degree 
 
• Household Spending- Monthly household spending in Georgian Lari (1-8) 
• Up to 150 GEL  
• 151-260GEL  
• 261-400GEL  
• 401-800GEL  
• 801-1200GEL  
• 1201-1600GEL  
• More than 1600GEL 
Dependent Variables 
• Russia is a Threat (1-5) 
• How much of a threat, if at all, is Russia to Georgia? 
1. Minor Threat 
2. Moderate Threat 
3. Serious Threat 
4. Very Serious Threat 
5. Extremely Serious threat  
• Russia Angry (1-5) 
• How angry do Russia’s actions in the region make you?  
1. Not Angry at All 
2. A Little Angry 
3. Angry 
4. Very Angry 
5. Extremely Angry 
• Georgia Should Join NATO (1-5) 
• Georgia should join NATO even if Russia threatens it militarily 
1. Disagree Strongly 
2. Disagree a Little 
3. Neither Agree Nor Disagree 
4. Agree a Little 
5. Agree Strongly 
• Recognize South Ossetia (1-5) 
• To reduce tensions with Russia, Georgia should recognize South Ossetia’s 
independence from Georgia 
1. Disagree Strongly 
2. Disagree a Little 
3. Neither Agree Nor Disagree 
4. Agree a Little 
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5. Agree Strongly 
• Recognize Abkhazia (1-5) 
• To reduce tensions with Russia, Georgia should recognize Abkhazia’s 
independence from Georgia 
▪ Disagree Strongly 
▪ Disagree a Little 
▪ Neither Agree Nor Disagree 
▪ Agree a Little 
▪ Agree Strongly 
 
A.2.2 Pre-Registered Hypotheses  
These stem from EGAP # 20151107AA41 
 
1.Anger and Fear will have distinct effects from each other and from the Control on 
foreign policy attitudes towards Russia 
1. Anger will lead to favoring a harder-line policy with Russia--support for 
joining more pro-Western groups, and helping Ukraine relative to Control and 
Informational treatment. 
2. Fear will have the opposite effect, leading respondents to be less willing to 
challenge Russian foreign policy, and seek more accommodation.   
2.Anger and Fear will have distinct effects from each other and distinct from the 
Control and Informational treatment on foreign policy attitudes towards Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia 
1. Anger will lead to favoring a harder-line policy Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia, and less in favor of reconciliation or normalization of relations 
2. Fear will have the opposite effect, leading those to be more in favor of 
reconciliation or normalization of relations 
a. Observational/non Experimental Hypotheses 
1.Respondents who have been victims/IDPs will favor a more muscular policy 
towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia relative to those that are not 
2.Controlling for IDP status, respondents living closer to Abkhazia/South Ossetia 
will be more cautious in their dealings with South Abkhazia/South Ossetia, since 
they have to bear the costs of any future conflict (i.e. O3 and O4 are not mutually 
exclusive) 
3.Those who score higher on the Honor Scale will support a tougher foreign policy 
towards Russia 
4.Those who score higher on the Honor Scale will support a tougher policy towards 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
5.Pro-Western/Saakashvili-supporters will support a tougher foreign policy towards 
Russia 
                                                 
41 These numbers on the hypotheses differ slightly from the EGAP since we have omitted the pre-
registered hypotheses from a separate survey experiment that was run as part of the full survey.  
 76 
 
 
 
  
 77 
A.3 Randomization Checks  
  
 
 (
1
)  
 (2)  
 (3
)  
 (
4
)  
 (
5
)  
 (
6
)  
 (
7
)  
 (
8
)  
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a
l
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11. Res
pon
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 H
o
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e
h
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S
p
e
n
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n
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a
r
r
i
e
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 I
D
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o
t
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W
a
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Information 
Treatment 
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1
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0
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.
0
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0
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0
4
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1
5  
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0
.
0
1  
 0
.
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0
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0
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0
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0
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1
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0
.
0
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0
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0
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0
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4
)  
4
)  
1
)  
4
)  
2
)  
2
)  
 Fear 
Treatment  
0.02  
 -
1.4
8  
 0.
0
5  
 -
0
.
0
2  
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 -
0
.
0
1  
 
 
 (
0
.
0
4
)  
 (1.4
4)  
 (0
.1
2)  
 (
0
.
0
4
)  
 (
0
.
1
1
)  
 (
0
.
0
4
)  
 (
0
.
0
2
)  
 (
0
.
0
2
)  
 
   
 Observation
s  
 1
2
2
2  
 122
2  
1116  
 1
2
2
2  
 1
2
2
2  
 1
2
2
1  
 1
2
2
0  
 1
2
0
5  
 
 R2 
 0
.
0
0
2  
 0.0
02  
 0.
0
0
3  
 0
.
0
0
0  
 0
.
0
0
3  
 0
.
0
0
1  
 0
.
0
0
1  
0.003  
 
 F-statistic  
 0
.
7
2  
 0.9
4  
 1.
0
3  
 0
.
1
5  
 1
.
1
9  
0.22  
 0
.
3
7  
 1
.
2
5  
 
 Prob>F  
 0
.
5
4  
 0.4
2  
 0.
3
8  
 0
.
9
3  
 0
.
3
1  
 0
.
8
8  
 0
.
7
7  
 0
.
2
9  
 
  
 Standard errors in parentheses  
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01  
 
 
Table A.3: Randomization Checks 
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A.4. Additional Results 
 
 
 Conflict 
Affecte
d Area 
IDP Know 
Someone 
Murdered 
South 
Ossetia 
Exposure 
Abkhazia 
Exposure 
Total 
War 
Exposure 
Conflict Affected 
Area 
1.00      
IDP 0.35 1.00     
Know Someone 
Murdered 
0.01 0.23 1.00    
South Ossetia 
Exposure 
0.40 0.49 0.09 1.00   
Abkhazia 
Exposure 
-0.01 0.59 0.48 -0.14 1.00  
Total War 
Exposure 
0.25 0.76 0.47 0.53 0.76 1.00 
 
Table A.4.1: Correlation between different measures of exposure to violence.  
 
 
 
 
 Russia is a 
Threat 
Russia 
Angry 
Georgia 
Join 
NATO 
Recognize 
Abkhazia 
Recognize 
South 
Ossetia 
Russia is a Threat 1.00     
Russia Angry 0.64 1.00    
Georgia Join 
NATO 
0.27 0.25 1.00   
Recognize 
Abkhazia 
-0.13 -0.25 -0.17 1.00  
Recognize South 
Ossetia 
-0.14 -0.28 -0.17 0.942 1.00 
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Table A.4.2: Correlations between all of the dependent variables 
 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  
 
Russia is a 
Threat  
Russia 
Angry  
Georgia Join 
NATO  
Recognize 
Abkhazia  
Recognize South 
Ossetia  
 
      
Any Treatment  
0.21** 
(0.09)  
0.12 
(0.08)  
0.23*** 
(0.08)  
-0.12 
(0.08)  
-0.15* 
(0.08)  
Kutaisi  
-0.12 
(0.18)  
-0.34** 
(0.15)  
-0.45*** 
(0.16)  
0.64*** 
(0.19)  
0.64*** 
(0.19)  
Conflict Affected 
Area 
0.16 
(0.19)  
0.05 
(0.19)  
-0.14 
(0.17)  
0.12 
(0.23)  
0.01 
(0.24)  
IDP  
0.40** 
(0.16)  
0.53*** 
(0.15)  
-0.03 
(0.15)  
-0.30 
(0.19)  
-0.31 
(0.20)  
Saakashvili 
Support  
0.24** 
(0.10)  
0.26*** 
(0.10)  
0.18** 
(0.09)  
0.16 
(0.10)  
0.14 
(0.10)  
Stress  
0.51** 
(0.22)  
0.18 
(0.21)  
-0.25 
(0.23)  
0.50* 
(0.26)  
0.34 
(0.28)  
Honor  
-0.04 
(0.35)  
0.48 
(0.30)  
-0.39 
(0.30)  
-0.30 
(0.33)  
-0.19 
(0.35)  
 
Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N  813.00  823.00  711.00  816.00  815.00  
Pseudo-R2  0.03  0.05  0.02  0.06  0.07  
 
Standard errors in parentheses  
Controls include Age, Sex, Marital Status, Education, and Monthly Household Spending. Note standard 
errors clustered at the voting precinct-level (PSU).  
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01  
 
 
 
Table A.4.3: Ordered Probit results 
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